PzKpfw VI TIGER I

Henschel und Sohn, of Kassel, Germany, was a well-known manufacturer of heavy industrial and railroad equipment, especially railroad locomotives and large dock cranes. Because of the size and weight of the Tiger, Henschel was considered to be the ideal manufacturer, having all the facilities needed to produce such a heavy vehicle. Henschel also had a fine engineering staff, and a complete vehicle test facility. The final assembly hall at Henschel's plant dwarfed the tanks being produced there and the final assembly line was capable of producing several tanks a day. Although much of the installed equipment on the Tiger was subcontracted, Henschel manufactured most of the major components in their plant. Hulls, turrets, and other contract items and assemblies were brought into the assembly building where final machining operations and detail assembling were done. Henschel's facilities allowed the firm to machine the turret rings and other critical areas of the hull within the plant without outside assistance.

Month and Year	Monthly Goal	Accepted	Normal	Befehls	Rebuilt	Chassis Nr.
April 1942	0	0+V1	1	0	0
May 1942	0	0	1	0	0
June 1942	5	1	0	0	0	25001
July 1942	15	0	0	0	0
August 1942	10	8	9	0	0	25009
September 1942	15	3	2	0	0	250012
October 1942	16	10+V2	8	0	0	250022
November 1942	18	17	14	0	0	250039
December 1942	30	37+V3	35	0	0	250076
January 1943	30	35	30	0	1	250111
February 1943	30	32	30	3	0	250143
March 1943	40	41	35	4	0	250184
April 1943	45	43	42	5	0	250230
May 1943	50	50	43	4	0	250280
June 1943	60	60	49	6	0	250340
July 1943	65	65	53	4	0	250405
August 1943	70	60	63	11	0	250465
September 1943	75	85	48	7	0	250550
October 1943	80	50	82	3	0	250600
November 1943	84	56	34	2	0	250656
December 1943	88	67	80	0	0	250723
January 1944	93	93	78	9	0	250816
February 1944	95	95	96	6	1	250911
March 1944	95	86	84	4	1	250997
April 1944	95	104	88	6	3	251101
May 1944	95	100	79	6	5	251201
June 1944	75	75	100	4	5	251276
July 1944	58	64	63	2	8	251340
August 1944	9	6	13	3	11	251346
TOTAL	1441	1349	1260	89	35
Source: JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6

Like all German Panzers, the Tiger I was subject of continuous changes and additions, as it became obvious that improvements could be made in the performance and effectiveness of the Tiger. Gradually the various problems reported were worked out, although some were never solved completely. The problems with ice and snow freezing on the interleaved road wheels were not solved until the introduction of the Tiger II with overlapping, not interleaved, road wheels In May, 1943, the Maybach HK 230 P45 engine with two air filters was installed in place of the Maybach HL 210 P45, and the transmission was improved, and with this upgrade the Tiger performance improved in normal use. In July 1943, the turret was extensively redesigned. A new commanders cupola with periscopes and a swivel hatch was installed, and along other modifications, an improved spring counter balance connected with a chain was installed for the 88 mm main gun.

Starting in September, 1943, Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating was applied at the factory to all upright surfaces that could be reached by a man standing on the ground. The surface was rippled to increase the distance to the steel surface without increasing the weight of the coating. From January 1944 on, the Nahverteidigungswaffe (close defense weapon) was mounted on the turret roof. This weapon could fire smoke cartridges, signal cartridges, and grenades, but due to shortages, was not mounted on the Tiger I until March 1944. In February 1944, steel road wheels with internal rubber cushioning, adopted from the Tiger II, were mounted in the Tiger I. These were chosen because of their ability to bear the weight of heavy armored vehicles.
From March 1944 on, the 25 mm roof plate was increased to 40 mm, to prevent penetration by large caliber artillery shells (over 150 mm), and the loader's hatch originally designed for the Tiger II turret was installed in the thicker turret roof. Finally, in April 1944, The monocular Turmzielfernröhr 9c sighting telescope replaced the previously used binocular Turmzielfernröhr 9b (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

While the Germans stayed close to their original production schedule for the Tiger, it is interesting to note that, for example, during Operation Zitadelle (the Kursk Offensive - July 1943) there were a total of only 133 Tigers available at the start of the offensive - 45 serving with sPzAbt.503, 13 with 13 Kp.SSPzRgt1 (LSSAH), 14 with 8.Kp.SSPzRgt2 (Das Reich), 15 with s.Kp.SSPzRgt3 (Totenkopf), 15 with 13.Kp.PzRgtGD (Großdeutschland), and finally 31 with sPzAbt.505. A total of 19 Tigers arrived as replacements during Operation Zitadelle: 5 for 13.Kp.SSPzRgt1 (LSSAH), and 14 for sPzAbt. 505. From 5 July to 20 July 1943, 13 Tigers were lost (total writeoffs): 4 by sPzAbt.503, 1 by 13.Kp.SSPzRgt1 (LSSAH), 1 by 8.Kp.SSPzRgt2 (Das Reich), 1 by s.Kp.SSPzRgt3 (Totenkopf), and 6 by sPzAbt.505 (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

By February 1944, sPzAbt.502 had 71 Tiger I tanks. At the same time, sPzAbt.503, 507, and 509 had respectively 69, 56 and 58 Tigers. This was due to transfers from other units training with the Tiger II, or due to the delivery of the last production Tiger I models. Tiger I production reached its peak between January and May 1944. Anyway, the maximum degree of success attained by the Tiger units was limited and/or localized tactical superiority. The truth was that the German industry simply couldn't produce Tigers in sufficient numbers to make any difference in the big picture - it was a task well beyond wartime German industry capabilities. Just as a comparison on productive capabilities, the Russians produced 23,937 T-34/76 from 1942 to 1945. The American Pershing tank was built at a rate of 1,350 tanks over a six month period. When production ceased in June 1945, 49,234 Sherman tanks had been built - more than all the German tank production during the entire war. In the end, it was this difference in production philosophy and faster Allied production that made the difference between defeat and victory. The real failure of the German very heavy tanks was that they exceeded the capabilities of the German industry to produce them in sufficient numbers.

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